I trace here some connections between contemporary reconfigurations of gendering, family and marriage in a matrilineal Muslim south Indian community (Kerala Koyas).
. Among coastal Muslim matrilineal communities, the situation is made more interesting yet, because of the weaving in of influences coming from 20 th century Islamic reformism, a strong transnational (Indian ocean) history and a vigorous contemporary Gulf presence.
Johnny Parry wrote about the contrasting marital histories of a Dalit illiterate father (bullock driver, factory labourer) and his highly educated (BA, MA, B.Ed) and respectably employed (schoolteacher) daughter. Parry argues that, "Marriage is rapidly changing its meaning … No longer merely a matter of the satisfactory discharge of marital duties, it is increasingly seen as a union between two intimate selves and carries a much heavier emotional freight " (2004:312) . Parry theorises a rapid break and also seems to approve of the general shift towards greater marital stability and 'intimacy': he cites approvingly Anthony Giddens' (at once clearly both ethnocentric and mistaken) argument that intimacy leads to equality; he also draws an opposition between the pragmatism of the older generation, for whom financial considerations were paramount, and the expectations he discerns among younger people that marriage is not primarily pragmatic but is about love, conjugality and intimacy. When, as a 1980s graduate student, I first heard about Giddens' 'pure relationships', I experienced a mixture of dismay and disbelief, and my negative assessment has not lessened as he has developed his arguments and they have been taken up in other academics' work (Giddens 1992) : I feel dismay that the moral embeddedness evoked by sacrifice and compromise is being evaluated so very negatively and ego-centrically, and disbelief that even academics could be so apparently deeply and uncritically embedded within their own modernist liberal expectations of a 'pure love' without sacrifice, compromise, a little touch of pragmatic adjustment and realism, a love enmeshed in the everyday messiness of domestic duties and hidden bargainings. 1 This ought not be troubling: kinship is an ambivalent relation (Peletz 2001:434) and caring is an ambivalent condition (Abel & Nelson 1990) . To be human is to be ambivalent. Academic studies of contemporary Western marriage and family are beginning to challenge idealized narratives (e.g. Simpson 1994 Simpson , 1998 Kipnis 2003 ; see also Blum 2005 and work from the 2011 interdisciplinary 'Gender and Love' project 2 ) but, as Borneman points out, until we properly study 'divorce' and severance as being part and parcel of 'marriage', the romantic myth of 'till death do us part' will hold fast even as normative model in the face of overwhelming anecdotal, personal and ethnographic evidence (1996, 2005) .
In any case, whether we name and positively evaluate it, following Giddens, as 'pure relationship ' (1992) , or name and critique it, following Zygmunt Bauman, as 'liquid love' (2003) , this particular form of love, shorn of embeddedness in family and the domestic, would seem indeed to stand at the opposite pole from conventional Indian expectations of marriage.
South Asian ethnography, however, suggests that the contemporary situation is not ushering in so much a clear transition from one form to another, but an altogether more ambivalent and hybrid picture -which then forces us to reflect back upon the reality of the contemporary western form which putatively supplies the model for, and the extreme outlier case of, a 'pure' love and companionate marriage.
Think about Parry's example: -Janaki's refusal of her rustic arranged-marriage partner and holding out for her chosen spouse (educated and employed as a teacher). I think we have at work here not a Giddens-style search for a 'pure relationship', but something more complex and ambivalent; an individualised insistence upon personal choice, for sure, but also a clear concern for a husband who will be a better domestic provisioner and a more ambitious father than the spouse chosen by the parent (Janaki's illiterate father, who lacks the competence to find and select a life-partner who will join in Janaki's future-oriented 'successful family' project).
While I certainly do not subscribe to Parry's celebratory assessment of recent changes, nor agree with all of his analysis, specifically his assessment that 'pure love' is ousting material considerations, I do agree with him that conjugality is sharply re-shaped under conditions of embourgeoisement, a process which post 1980s economic and communications shifts are helping disseminate to a wider section of the Indian population. Laura Ahearn's study of shifts away from arranged marriage and towards love marriage in Nepal supports my argument, in as much as she finds that 'love' and 'life success' are very much tied together in the search for a suitable love match spouse (Ahearn 2001) , something clear also in Patricia Uberoi's recent work (2006) .
Moving away from the over-represented and disputed Indian 'middle classes' (Deshpande 2003) , Shalini Grover (2009 , 2011a , 2011b has explored with careful nuance the ways in which marriage in low income low caste Delhi families is fluid, with social sanction given in these 'slum' neighbourhoods -and even by police and NGOs -to informal divorce, remarriage, and a variety of semi-formal separations and unions. She carefully tracks the ways in which a combination of pragmatic considerations (economic survival, childcare), personal desires (romantic aspirations, women's wish for relative autonomy) and contingent factors (a man's drinking habits, a woman's promiscuity) come together as the ground from which marriages are made, unmade, and often remade or re-adjusted. It would be impossible to claim from Grover's ethnography that marriage among the poor is a purely economic affair, surveying the tales of love, lust and romance that she tells; or to hold on to the old romantic-ethnographic idea that the difference between Indian respectable middle class marriages and those of the poor is that the former are a matter of property and family while the latter are done simply for 'love'. I'm arguing here then that the 'arranged' versus 'love' dichotomy has properly broken down, even before the emergence of recent hybrid forms (Donner 2002 , Fuller & Narasimhan 2008 , not simply then as empirical description but as analytic, since all marriage across all social classes involves a mix of practical-pragmatic, economic and affectual-passionate considerations and forces. The bottom line, then, of 'love' across South Asian social classes, whether it is permitted before marriage (as in Ahearn's Nepali case) or expected to blossom after marriage (as in contemporary Kerala) is, I am arguing, continuous with older forms of marriage even as it is part of a contemporary re-shaping of conjugal expectations.
Sanjay Srivastava has suggested that, "One way of thinking about the ideas of romance and love that congregate in the present context is that they elaborate a narrative for the 'future development' of the individual; they point to the discourse of agency that is connected to the 'economic' but not reducible to it " (2004:202) . While certainly not simply reducible to economics, it is clear that a tight relationship exists between economic conditions and social attitudes towards individualism, choice and 'love'. What we might be seeing then is not a shift from mixed motives to pure relationship, nor a transition from pragmatism to 'love', but the emergence of more individualized subjects who demand more say in spousal choice and a slightly different configuration of their intimate lives, while keeping hold of an understanding that marriage is a life partnership and is tied up with both economic matters and the raising of children. Childcare, Borneman (2005) claims, is globally a more relevant issue in marriage and household strategies than is economic provisioning or sexual partnering. Children are also central to marriage in as much as they become, in contemporary global capitalist societies, the prime target of fantasies about futurity and success, economic well-being and social status; children also, of course, offer parenthood, generally a chance to consolidate an impeccably normative mature gender status 3 (Edelman 1998; Patel 2006; C. & F. Osella 2006) .
At the same time as I explore here love as part of new family forms, I am also interested in untangling some of the ways in which modernity's 'love' is configured as a blend of exclusivity of affect, (hetero-)sexual desire, and 'correct' gendering. Giddens' assumption that 'gay love' represents the most easily traversed path towards the desired pure relationship is empirically naïve and is, for me, a clearly recognizable case of the idealization which the straight normatively gendered man often holds for his disavowed and abjected other. Moreover, Giddens' story of disembedding completely overlooks the processes traced by feminist and queer writers by which 'love' and 'desire' repeatedly come to the service of the norm (Rubin 1975; Langford 1999; Warner 2000; Povinelli 2002; Kipnis 2003 4 ) . Like 'sexuality', 'love' is indeed inextricably tied up with modernity's production of manageable subjects, the production of such (gendered, sexed, sexualised) subjects being a process which, as queer theory (following Foucault 1990 , Butler 1990 ) has exhaustively shown (e.g. Sedgwick 1990) (Parkin 1989; Stivens 1996; Blackwood 1999 Blackwood , 2005 Simpson and Kresse 2007 experience. But naturally, desire must be negotiated within a framework of morality (Metcalf 1984; Perneau 2003; Jeffery et al 2004) . In Calicut, this takes on a very self-conscious modernist
Islamic reformism is one of the strong influences at work in the critique of matriliny.
Reformists argue that the tharavadu system fosters a lack of responsibility in men, since wives and children are accommodated in the matrilineal home, where mothers and brothers will see that women and their children will never starve, even if a woman's husband is feckless.
Reformists object to tharavadus being in women's names and passed down only through and to women. Reformists also worry that matriliny does not allow for a proper modern Islamic moral family to grow, since men are not spending enough time in the same domestic space as their wives and children. Men, daytimes, take lunch in their natal home or a meals hotel; in the evenings, they are out on the streets, with friends, especially between Maghrib and Isha prayers.
To be sure, they are attending five times prayer, observing ramzan fasts, giving zakat and so on; is an open secret, even within the wider space of India (Merchant 1999) . This is becoming increasingly embarrassing for some. A switch to a neo-patriarchal household is one way for men to make performances of impeccable heterosexuality and masculinity (C & F Osella 2006).
Some men, who have both the capital and the will, are choosing to buy or build small new homes and abandon the tharavadu.
The residential practices in tharavadus -where men have little rights or responsibilities in the property and where they shuttle between their natal home (daytime) and their wife's home (night-time) is becoming embarrassing for some men, who increasingly aspire to a home of their own. The term used in the community which gets translated into English as 'husband' is puthiya pilla, literally the 'new boy', a term which indicates the degree to which men in pre-reform matrilineal households were not configured as substantial members of the post-marital home, but were incomers whose status remained always rather marginal (see F Osella in press for a detailed discussion of men's position in the matrilineal family and their contemporary evaluations of it).
While Blackwood points out that men in matrilineal or matrifocal situations are often actually central in their natal households, in Calicut, the material practices of tharavadu life enact a generalized male marginality to the household -in effect, men belong neither to their own natal home, which is the province and inheritable property of their mothers and sisters, nor to their wives/mother-in-law's home, where they also hold no inheritance rights and remain always a guest -albeit (sometimes ostensibly) an honoured one. In classic tharavadu living, a man arrives at his wife's house for late evening dinner and leaves after breakfast. we sanguinely accept male marginality to processes of child-rearing, I analyse Islamic reformist males' publicly expressed anxieties about matriliny more as expressions of a desire for more power and status in the household than of a desire to be more involved in either nurturing service or domestic duties. As one young reformist man who had divorced from his tharavadu marriage and opted for a second marriage with neo-local virifocal household (with a woman from an inland patrilineal family) told me, "You get no respect in the tharavadu really, it is your wife's place".
Increasing mass exposure post 1970s migration to the practices of Gulf Arabs, which include strict patrilinearity, widely visible performances of masculine control and power, and specific (very different from Kerala) styles of using both cash and time in a very family-focused manner, is undoubtedly another of the influences at work here. The new 'small family' style is not, I suggest a straightforward mimetic appropriation of Hindu and Christian middle-class styles, nor North Indian styles, as seen on TV, but picks up on ideas about 'family life' which are learned or observed in the Gulf. Andrew Gardner (2011) points out that Gulf states' migration and visa policies have helped to materially re-configure 'family' in South Asian practice as nuclear-patriarchal rather than extended. I would add that Khaleeji (Gulf Arab) husband, wife and kids can often be seen out together window shopping in the mall, picnicking in a park, or having ice cream in a smart café. These are the kinds of practices which I have witnessed coming into Kerala, and they have clearly not come in as part of post 1990s Indian economic shifts, but emerged much earlier, and as part of an at first self-conscious but now increasingly Many Calicut women indeed feel reluctant to move into a new 'small house' where they will no longer have the company and domestic help of their mothers, sisters, aunts and cousins, but will be the sole domestic worker, deprived of continuous female company and under the rule of their husband rather than their own mother. One woman in her 40s looked downright miserable as she and her husband showed me around the new 5 roomed house he had bought.
He was imagining himself finally master of his own home, rather than guest in his wife's tharavadu; she told me that, more than the increased workload, she was dreading the loss of company -for her husband would be out at work as usual for long hours at the bazaar and then out socialising with his male friends after evening prayers.
Even some younger men choose the benefits of the tharavadu. While the discourse of 'local custom' or culturally specific adaptations to Islam (adab) as permissible is usually rejected by reformists, when it comes to matriliny, an exception is often made (see F Osella in press for fuller discussion). Women are also turning in several directions and we can trace the coexistence of many trends which are utterly opposed to each other. We have at the same time a defence of and even a folk-ish nostalgia for the old fully joint tharavadu system, even as it is on its last legs, along with a condemnation of it as not conducive either to proper conjugal and paternal love or to economic progress.
The contemporary Gulf in the Kerala household
I have written elsewhere about the rejection by most women of Kerala's older style pardah and the take-up of the abaya (C & F Osella 2007). The Gulf here plays a part as a source for contemporary Muslim fashion trends, and as a filter-space where global consumer goods can be both accessed and also assessed for their conformity to Islamic decency.
The arrival of a 'door to door' is a moment of great excitement in any household. These parcels, couriered from Gulf-based husbands, are of enormous importance in evoking the love which an absent man holds for his wife and children. Parcels contain gifts and also household items which are to be put away ready for when the couple shift to their own new house. Along with useful consumer goods (e.g. mixer-grinders), items which are not used in Kerala -kettles, toasters -are sometimes sent. Such items are able to allude to the modern domestic lifestyle imagined in the planned 'small house', while being cheap and easy to buy in supermarkets like LuLu or Carrefour. A man may not be up to sending a washing machine or flat-screen TV, but a toaster does essentially the same symbolic work for him and his wife, of calling up for them their imagined future in their own independent kitchen, where drudgery over a stone grinder or washtap will be replaced by deployment of consumer electricals. Gifts also, as I have argued elsewhere, metonymically replace the man's presence and act as extensions of his masculine (earning) power, ensuring that even at a distance, he continues to reach into the house (2000: 138ff).
Apart from electricals, clothes and shoes for wife and kids and some luxury goods such as perfumes, parcels often contain food items. Huge tins of Nido dried milk and Tang orange drink powder are much appreciated back home and generally shared with the wider household.
What is less likely to be shared are the 'special' foods intended particularly for a man's own children. One mother told me that her husband knew that his daughter never wanted to eat breakfast. He had sent a large box of cornflakes, with instructions that these could be taken with Nido dried milk. When I next popped by, I saw the daughter happily eating cornflakes exactly as they were presented in the 'serving suggestion' photo on the box -with milk and strawberries.
Eager to taste the full-on breakfast, mother had visited a fancy fruit stall to buy imported (from Ooty) fruit. Here, it is beside the point that cornflakes are easily available in Calicut or that strawberries are an outlandishly costly item. The point is that breakfast in a tharavadu usually means (female labour-intensive) fried breads and curry; cornflakes evoke a quite different lifestyle. The parents have, through father's gift and mother's careful attention to 'serving suggestions', tried to offer their daughter the very best of modern consumer treats, aimed at shaping her into both bodily strength and modernity and re-working the family unit into a different type from the tharavadu family: into a small group of individuals bonded by love, where children are cherished, modern, deserving of 'special' treats and so on, and where mothers and fathers lovingly join in forging their 'small family' project of social mobility.
The shift towards the 'small family' as the normative site of pleasure and companionship is clear when we think about the commonest four types of group which come on Saturday or Sunday evening to Calicut beach, where crowds throng to walk, watch the sunset, buy snacks and maybe go afterwards for faluda at an ice-cream parlour. A walk on the beach, admiring the Arabian sea, is a cheap form of entertainment available to all and, unlike the costly tours mentioned above, invitations to join a group do not need to be limited. On the beach, we find large groups of womenfolk from a tharavadu with all their children; given the size of the group (maybe 5 -10 women) and the presence of older women, no man is necessary for chaperone here, nor indeed is one usually present. This is a practice which is apparently longstanding:
while nowadays crowds arrive from 4pm onwards, oral history recounts to us that women used to come out in groups after dark to the beach, where they then felt relatively screened from male view or public censure. The second set of groups that we will always find on the beach is made up of young men (maybe 4 -15 of them together) enjoying each other's company while they also look surreptitiously at girls, cruise for sexual adventure with older men (or combine both activities). Then we can see some much smaller groups of older men in the company of a few friends; they may be chatting companionably, or cruising young men. Finally, we also see plenty of nuclear families, fathers buying balloons and paper screws of peanuts for the kids, chatting with their wives and sharing smiles at the kids' joy and antics. The contemporary thrust would see all the first three types of group replaced by the latter; presumably the older men and women in the first and third groups, enjoying the comforts of a same-sex social outing, would have to find their place as 'granny' or 'grandad' in one of the nuclear family groups -or be left at home.
The groups of young men -of course, the most demonised of all those whose practices are now suddenly deemed unmodern and/or immoral -would have to take their place, meanwhile, as junior males, no longer free to roam and challenge social convention (C & F Osella 2006) but now constrained to pass their free time in mixed groups and to act according to public morality, under firm eyes of elders and the presence of their own fathers. Women would be pried out from their large homosocial groups and re-situated not as 'daughter' or 'grand-daughter' but as 'mother' and 'wife' and as firmly under husband's control and care. Presumably, the women whose husbands are away in the Gulf would simply stay at home, along with their children, if there were no nearby grandfather to take them out; her brother would, of course, be occupied with his 'own' family. While brother and sister obligations and affective ties are cultivated and expected to be intense in tharavadu living, in a new 'small family', a man is expected to turn towards his wife.
Negotiating desire and morality
Transformation of one's intimate life is not merely a moral duty, since it is also part of a desire for the modern. This encompasses a keen desire to assert self-respect and escape the continuing critique of those Hindu communities (like the Nayars) who abandoned matriliny in the colonial period (see e.g. Fuller 1976; Jeffrey 1976 Jeffrey , 1993 Devika 2006 Devika , 2007 ; but it is also powerfully shaped by aspirations towards that 'modern' family lifestyle which opens up new spaces and earmarks time for consumption and leisure. This returns me to my opening remarks about the explicit links which seem to be able to be made between (heterosexual, conjugal) 'love' and 'economic progress', and points towards work which thinks through the ways in which the disciplining forces producing good consumer citizens works right down into the realm of the intimate (see e.g. Patel 2004 Patel , 2006 Mazzarella 2001) . But these are not processes which proceed straightforwardly (cf. Filippo Osella in press for discussion of the ambivalences among menfolk).
Wedding videos are highly condensed sites where both fantasies and conventions are woven together and where romance, glamour and lavish spending are always expressed within idioms of the local, the authentic, and are situated firmly within the control of the moral family.
Contemporary video-makers take bride and groom out to some beauty-spot a day or two after the wedding, and encourage the pair to 'act out' a fated romantic connection. In one such that I was shown, the groom was placed sitting pensively on a fallen tree trunk. His bride wore make-upusually an item considered utterly haram -and was dressed in her mailanchi night choli 8 , with hair loose and hidden only perfunctorily under its flimsy shawl. She was made to run towards the groom, provoking some embarrassment among us women who sat watching the video as we noted how her breasts swung for all to see on film. Still, no matter; the romance, glamour and sexuality being presented here were intended for the husband, and the video was a site where husband and wife were encouraged to imagine themselves as filmi lovers. Re-watching a wedding video with one pair of sisters, the younger woman (the recent bride) called out, "I love you!" whenever her husband appeared on screen. Not to be out-done, her elder sister, whose husband is a Gulf migrant and comes home infrequently, blew noisy kisses to her husband (of 10 years) when he came into shot. Knowing these women well, and having talked often with them about their husbands and their (arranged) marriages, their actions at that moment seemed to me at once ironic, sincere and expressive of longings unfulfilled. If we refuse to follow Giddens'
liberal sentiments, and if we refuse the move -at once Orientalising and self-deluding -of imagining 'Western' love realities as accurately described by the fantasy model, then we need feel no anxiety at such hybrid and mixed feelings, nor hope for teleological 'progress' involving purging and resolution in the direction of a 'pure' love.
All this 'love discourse' is radically different from older (pre 1990s) wedding photographs and videos, in which the newly weds are not at all expected to behave like lovebirds, much less demonstrate sexual attractiveness or attraction. Giggling embarrassment While men seem right now to be generally afraid and anxious, and seeking in various ways to exercise greater control over women, women themselves are resentful and angry with those women whose actions are now having consequences for all Calicut Muslim women. I heard no sympathy or empathy expressed among women anywhere for either the runaway brides or the adulterous women. Women committed to Islamic reformism spoke of the need for more moral (by which was intended Quaranic) education for women; women not so committed spoke of the need for a collectivist sensibility, in which individual women would realise that their actions impact upon all women, and would hence become considerate and act with more circumspection. Women strongly criticised the irresponsibility, selfishness and lack of foresight of those women who had taken part in 'romance'. Such women, I was told, were not thinking about the risks and the future impact upon themselves and others of such a course of action, nor were they acting pragmatically. Women told me that of course it is normal to have 'boyfriends' before marriage 11 , but to imagine that this could continue in later life is madness. The renunciation of individual desire and 'love' in favour of agreeing to parental choice and arranged marriage was, women agreed, all part of the normal life trajectory; to try to make a marriage out of teenage 'love' was foolhardy (cf Joseph 2005) . As with my earlier research work among rural Hindu women, even those who had done 'love marriages' (I met one such woman in Calicut) openly told me that they regretted it, and that the stigma and the loss of family/community material and social support, had not been worth it. Meanwhile, women expressed strongly the view that to embark upon an extra-marital affair with an outsider to the close family was sheer idiocy. The example of the 'too free' and 'too glamorous' Arab woman appeared sometimes as negative moral example in these discussions of where one could end up. The heterosexual desire and love which is being introduced and cultivated around Calicut is clearly understood, as the wedding videos suggest, as something which must be firmly embedded within the safety, stability and morality of marriage and a wider family group.
Interestingly, the role of Muslim young men themselves in initiating 'romance' and the widespread participation of older Muslim men in extra-marital affairs and in engaging sex workers (male and female) was not brought up at all by any of our research respondents. When
Filippo raised the issue with those with whom it was possible to speak of such matters, men abruptly changed the subject and refused to engage in any discussion of men's part in 'illicit' behaviours, or even to respond to Filippo's suggestion that a degree of hypocrisy and double standard was operating (F Osella in press; cf. Devika 2005 Devika , 2009 ).
When I raised the issue of men's hypocritical moral panics with womenfolk, they would remark that, "Men are all like this [i.e. 'sex mad'] and they think we are too, so they always put all the suspicion and control on us". Yet at the same time, women neither confront nor blame men, and continue instead to blame other women for their role in provoking male suspicion and anger and hence for precipitating greater control on all women. In line with what has been explored with regard to male violence in Pakistan (Ring 2006) , it seems that women in Kozkikode are accepting men, 'just as they are', and rather than cultivating hopes or expectations for men to change, they are placing the onus on other females to adjust to and manage their relationships with men. This necessarily includes socialisation of daughters.
One reason for the phenomenon of the eruption of 'love marriages' and adultery would seem to be growing expectations of what marriage should entail and hence a greater potential for dissatisfaction with pre-existing styles of marital bond. Yet most women choose to pursue the path of virtue and conformity to expectation, from a mixture of conviction (that this is the right way), pragmatism (that this is the only liveable way) and indifference (how important in your life is your husband anyway?). The generation of women aged 25 -40 are in between old and new family styles, raised on the cusp of matrilineal homosociality and neo-patriarchal conjugality, and accordingly embody considerable ambivalence.
Finally, Evelyn Blackwood's review of anthropological discussions of matrilineal kinship and matrifocal families supports arguments, following feminist analyses of kinship such as Janet Carsten (2000 ) Sarah Franklin (2001 or Marilyn Strathern (1992 Strathern ( , 1996 Strathern ( , 2005 , that we cease to work outwards from terms of assumed universal relevance, 'heterosexual marriage' being one such, and instead pay attention to the ways in which relatedness, caregiving, and attachment are configured in particular locations. From this stance, taking 'marriage' as both analytic focus and as an assumed necessity in the formation of households and the careful raising of children indicates nothing so much as anthropology's continuing complicity with the dominant (heteronormative, neo-patriarchal) discourse of modern western society. Imagining 'love' as then at once both necessary to marriage and as a positive or 'pure' force working progressively to replace pragmatic considerations of childcare and provisioning indicates the degree to which anthropologists themselves remain in thrall to -and lamentably unreflexive and uncritical of -the paradoxical means by which they themselves have been produced as liberal desiring subjects (cf. Mahmood 2001 Mahmood , 2005 Joseph 2005 ).
